Turkish and Arabic areas of the former Ottoman Empire. 7 Another such person was Maria Jacobsen (1882 Jacobsen ( -1960 , a missionary and nurse working for Kvindelige Missions Arbejdere (KMA, ''Women Missionary Workers''), who was stationed in Harput (Kharpert) in the vilayet of Mamouret-ul-Aziz from the fall of 1907 until 1919. Both women witnessed every aspect of the Armenian Genocide-death marches, massacres, starvation, resistance, forced Islamization-from their respective geographical positions in the Ottoman Empire; and still, under these extremely difficult conditions, they managed to save the lives of literally thousands. 8 Persons like Jacobsen and Jeppe were thus in an ideal position to give accurate accounts of the implementation of the genocide on the local and regional levels, but when it came to giving accounts of the overall political, economic, and ideological framework for the genocide, no Western observers was better suited than the diplomats in Constantinople.
A Danish Diplomat in Constantinople: Carl Ellis Wandel
At the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Denmark declared neutrality. But, the fear among the government and the general population that Germany would occupy some or all of the small country as a preventive measure to secure access through the Danish straits led to the Danish neutrality policy toward Germany being declared ''benevolent.'' It also had the effect of temporarily diverting interest from matters concerning, for instance, the plight of the Ottoman Armenian population some 2,000 miles away. But for Danes stationed in the Ottoman Empire during the war, the organized persecution of the Armenians was a tangible reality from the very beginning. One unknown, but important, Danish observer was Carl Ellis Wandel , who made up the entire diplomatic staff of the Danish legation in Constantinople (Istanbul) from 1914 to 1925.
Carl Ellis Wandel was born in Copenhagen and was commercially trained as a merchant in the family wine-importing business. When he was appointed minister (i.e., envoy) and head of the Danish legation in Constantinople in the summer of 1914, he was already an experienced diplomat. While running the family's wine cork factory in Lisbon, he had served as consul general in that city from [1904] [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] , and when he moved to Argentina in 1909, he went within a few years from consul general in Buenos Aires to minister and full-time diplomat there until 1913, when it was decided that he should be transferred to the Ottoman Empire. 9 Wandel took over the responsibility of dealing with official Danish relations from the Swedish legation, most likely as part of a drive for Danish trade interests in an area that was gaining increasing significance in Europe as a producer of raw materials as well as a purchaser of Western products. Judging by the hundreds of confidential reports he sent to the Danish foreign ministry from 1914 onward, now held in the Danish National Archives in Copenhagen, Wandel was a thorough and conscientious diplomat, analyzing the social and political developments in the Ottoman Empire in a knowledgeable, usually detached, and often very detailed way, with a constant eye to the possible effects these developments could have on Danish trade interests in the region.
What makes Wandel an especially important and credible witness to developments in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, including the Armenian Genocide, is a combination of several factors. First, he was a neutral observer from a neutral country-or, more precisely, a country whose government, not least its powerful foreign minister, Erik Scavenius, insisted on upholding the abovementioned ''benevolent neutrality'' toward neighboring Germany and her allies. 10 Scavenius's general stance was to not blame anything on any of the warring parties, since he saw the war itself as an ''uncontrollable machine that crushes everything.'' 11 He was certainly not a person to let potentially ''controversial'' considerations, such as a bias toward a persecuted minority in the Ottoman Empire, influence Danish foreign policy. In fact, when the Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian foreign ministries, through their respective royal courts, received an official request from the national Armenian delegation in Paris in April 1918 to intervene on behalf of the surviving Armenians in Armenia, who were being severely persecuted by Turkish troops following the withdrawal of the Russian army, the apparently unanimous answer from these neutral nations was that ''nothing would be done. '' 12 Second, Wandel's status as a diplomat from a ''harmless'' country (i.e., a small, neutral country without imperialistic ambitions) undoubtedly further enhanced his ability to gain the trust of the large number of influential political players he had access to. Apart from the obvious differences in economic and military strength, and therefore in diplomatic leverage, this status is somewhat reminiscent of the status of the United States in the Ottoman Empire before 1917. 13 Also, most of Wandel's reports and analyses were confidential, and they were drafted with the purpose of giving accurate and reliable information to the Danish foreign ministry, a ministry that an experienced diplomat like Wandel is unlikely to have expected would actually be moved to make even a symbolic gesture toward the Ottoman Armenians or, for that matter, toward any other Ottoman minority. Neither did Wandel at any point suggest or expect that any action should be taken in this direction. Indeed, at one point he states in a report, ''When the cannons talk, the diplomats must be silent.''
14 Unlike the legations of other then-neutral nations, such as the United States, Greece, and Bulgaria, 15 the Danish legation does not seem to have been approached in the summer of 1915 by Ottoman Armenian representatives seeking diplomatic intervention on behalf of their fellow Armenians. But, Wandel agreed with his colleagues that only Germany, as the Ottoman Empire's most powerful ally, had the potential to significantly influence the Young Turks, although during the genocide he came to believe that the Young Turks had become so thoroughly radicalized that even a forceful German intervention could no longer help the Ottoman Armenians. 16 This does not mean that Wandel was indifferent to the sufferings of the Armenians. On the contrary, as both a moral and a rational human being, he was highly affected by the genocide and wrote extensively about it in his reports, in which he could also, at times, point approvingly to objections raised by diplomats from other neutral countries against the persecutions of the Armenians. In his capacity as a diplomat, however, he adhered to strict neutrality. This was the case, when, in 1917, he was strongly urged by the American ambassador, Abram I. Elkus, Henry Morgenthau's successor, to protest against the continued persecution of the Ottoman Pontic Greeks living on the Black Sea coast. Wandel simply noted this fact in his report to the foreign ministry, and apparently neither he nor the ministry took any action. 17 Also, even though Wandel was kept well informed of the increasing persecution and subsequent genocide of the Armenians by his connections in, for instance, the German, Spanish, Persian, Vatican, Dutch, American, and other embassies and legations, 18 as well as in the Ottoman Turkish establishment, 19 among missionaries from Denmark and other countries, 20 and among Armenian and other Ottoman Christian circles, his reliability as a witness is further shown by the fact that he was not immediately ready to think the worst of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) regarding its policy toward the Armenians. During the summer of 1915, Wandel did realize that the Young Turk dictatorship had both the desire and the means to pursue its genocidal policy to its conclusion. But still, as shown below, it was not before 4 September of that year that he finally realized that the authorities would not stop short of a policy of outright extermination of the Armenian population. He came to this realization considerably later than most other Western observers, who had already recognized and reported this fact in June or July.
Best known are the reports from well-placed contemporary diplomats, missionaries, and rescue workers, such as the German theologian Johannes Lepsius, 21 the German ambassador Hans von Wangenheim, 22 and the American ambassador Henry Morgenthau. 23 But also the very experienced Swedish ambassador to Constantinople, Per Gustaf August Cosswa Anckarsvä rd, reported on 6 July 1915 that
The persecutions of the Armenians have taken on appalling proportions, and everything is pointing toward the idea that the Young Turks have wanted to take advantage of an opportunity where, for various reasons, no effective pressure from the outside needs to be feared to once and for all terminate the Armenian question. The method is simple enough and consists of the extermination of the Armenian nation. 24 This policy of extermination was a policy that, for Wandel and other observers, was not only cruel and unjust but also irrational, since they believed that the Empire would thus deprive itself of some of its ablest, most industrious, and best-educated citizens. 25 Background and Motivation for the Genocide: Ideology and the CUP One of the key points of disagreement in the historiography of the Armenian Genocide concerns whether the Young Turk policy of extermination was conceived for political, ideological, and/or economic reasons in advance of World War I or whether the actual decision was made mainly as a consequence of (incidents and radicalization related to) the war. 26 This debate between what could be dubbed, in somewhat simplistic terms, ''intentionalist'' and ''structuralist'' interpretations is still ongoing. I will touch upon it only briefly here, but to me there is no doubt that scholars explaining the Armenian Genocide as the result of a mainly (but certainly not exclusively) ''structural'' process of cumulative radicalization have provided the most convincing interpretations, by which I mean simply that I have yet to see any truly convincing evidence that the physical destruction of the Ottoman Armenians had been planned before the spring or summer of 1915. 27 Two things must be stated concerning this debate, however. First, it is a purely academic debate, in the sense that the Armenian Genocide is of course a genocide whether it was decided upon years or months before World War I 28 or as late as the spring or summer of 1915. 29 The destruction was profoundly intentional as opposed to, say, ''accidental'': real people were systematically and intentionally annihilated by other real people, not by faceless ''structural forces.'' Second, the debate is not finished. The matter has yet to be settled, especially since it is generally difficult, and sometimes impossible, to decide whether increasingly genocidal actions during wars or revolutions are mainly the results of such events, premeditated results of atrocities committed under the cover of the events, or, as has become an increasingly more common interpretative model within genocide studies, a ''twisted road'' (i.e., the results of a dynamic combination of premeditation and circumstances). 30 As in other cases of genocide, in the case of the Armenian Genocide more evidence and more sources need to be taken into consideration. What ''structuralists'' as well as ''intentionalists'' do agree on is that it is clear that the radicalization of the Young Turk policy toward the non-Turkish minorities of the Ottoman Empire began not only before the outbreak of World War I but also before the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. As early as 1908, the year of the Young Turk revolution, the CUP paper Tanin declared that ''the Turkish nation is and will remain the ruling nation,'' 31 and in July 1910, a pro-Turkish, French-language journal based in Saloniki, Progre`s de Salonique, wrote on the growing Japanese and Turkish nationalist movements that ''at the head of these movements will be found the peoples belonging to the same race-the Mongolians. Each one possesses the unquestionable title to the moral and intellectual supremacy of the great countries over which their influence extends. '' 32 That same year, at the Young Turk congress in Saloniki, it was declared outright that the ''Ottomanization'' of the population of the empire-that is, the replacement of (for instance) a primarily ethnic Armenian identity with an Ottoman one-could not be achieved by persuasion but had to be achieved through forcible measures. 33 And, according to the memoirs of the renowned Danish Orientalist and former rector of the University of Copenhagen, Johannes Østrup, at least one crucially important CUP member had simultaneously, before rising to the very top of the Young Turk hierarchy, expressed such distrust toward the Ottoman Armenians that he had called for their extermination. In 1937 Østrup almost casually recalls a series of business meetings with Mehmet Talâ t Pasha in 1910:
It had really been Talat's plan to exterminate all of the Armenian people, and the plan did not originate as the result of a war psychosis. I spoke with Talâ t on several occasions in the autumn of 1910, and among many other things we also talked about the Armenians. ''You see,'' he said, ''between us and this people there is an incompatibility which cannot be solved in a peaceful manner; either they will completely undermine us, or we will have to annihilate them. If I ever come to power in this country, I will use all my might to exterminate the Armenians.'' Six years later he fulfilled his promise; the persecutions which were effectuated in the years of 1915 and 1916 cost-according to the lowest counts-the lives of more than 1.5 million persons. And yet one could not but like Talâ t; he was a barbarian or a fanatic, whatever one wants to call it, but his soul was free from deceit. 34 It must be noted that Østrup, a conservative and a rather cynical realpolitiker who admired Kemal Atatü rk as well as Talâ t, generally had no liking for either the Armenians or the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, sharing as he did the popular prejudice among members of the Turkish elite, 35 as well as among many European Orientalists and other observers at the time, that these peoples were ''deceiving,'' ''cowardly,'' and ''mercantilist.'' This view was opposed to that of Turks, Kurds, and/or Arabs, who were often considered ''pure'' and ''rural'' and were thought to possess a more ''warlike'' spirit. 36 Ottoman Armenians were a relatively well-educated, socially mobile minority, and, together with the Ottoman Greeks, they made up a comparatively large part of the empire's small middle class. Whereas some 70-80% of the Armenians were in fact peasants, and many Armenian city-dwellers were relatively poor, they, like the Jews in Europe, were seen as the incarnation of the despised, Westernized ''mercantile spirit.'' This view is illustrated in a contemporary account of the ''racial'' characteristics of Entente prisoners in German POW camps, in which Russian Armenians are described as being a ''cunning race of merchants. '' 37 At the same time, Armenians were also seen by Turkish nationalists as hindering the development of an ethnic Turkish mercantile class.
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But even though Ottoman Armenians were generally disliked and distrusted by many Westerners and Muslims alike, and even though, as Johannes Østrup recalls it, the main instigator of the Armenian Genocide desired their extermination as early as 1910, it does not follow that there was an actual Young Turk plan of genocide before World War I. It does suggest, however, that there is some truth in the notion shared by ''intentionalist'' scholars, such as Vahakn Dadrian, that a desire to seek a thoroughly radical solution, including extermination, to a perceived problem existed in influential Young Turk circles even before the beginning of the Balkan Wars. 39 The loss of Ottoman territory, the massacre or forced migration of hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the Balkans and Caucasus, and the World War, with its instances of initial Turkish defeat, Armenian resistance, and so on, were most likely among the main events necessary to radicalize large parts of the Turkish establishment and population to such an extent that they were willing to carry out an overtly exterminatory policy against Armenians and other, mainly Christian, Ottoman minorities. But, a perhaps rudimentary, but certainly radical and influential, ideology that was just as necessary for traditional anti-Armenian sentiments to develop into a genocidal policy did already exist before these developments, as Wandel also points out (see below). 40 As Taner Akçam has noted, Turkish nationalism came late compared not only to the nationalisms of Western Europe but also to the nationalisms of other Ottoman groups, and, like other ''delayed nationalisms,'' it was aggressive and belligerent, determined to revive past glory and right perceived wrongs. 41 Generally, whether or not one as a Western observer before World War I knew or believed that there was a radical segment of the CUP that desired a radical solution of the ''Armenian question,'' the official Young Turk policy of creating a multicultural ''Ottoman'' identity instead of the various more or less developed national identities in the empire was regarded as unrealistic. Although some observers were, at least initially, optimistic to various degrees, others were much more cautious. 42 The Norwegian KMA missionary in Mush, Bodil Biørn, though hopeful that the 1908 revolution would lead to reforms benefiting the Ottoman Armenians, was at the same time skeptical as to how such reforms would be implemented in a world ruled by ''inequality, corruption, violence, and murder.'' 43 In 1932, a member of the Danish KMA, Elise Bockelund, summed up in plain language the missionaries' view of the CUP revolution: ''The Young Turk rule was a disappointment; they did not keep their promises, and, though they themselves were irreligious, they still gave preference to Islam, so the Armenians were not safe.'' 44 Wandel exemplified the Young Turks' pre-war discriminatory policies by reporting that the electoral system was designed to discriminate heavily against Christians and that the authorities, despite their promises, did not want to give back Anatolian land to Armenians driven away during or after the Abdul Hamid massacres. 45 A 1911 report from the Danish embassy in Rome analyzing the ongoing uprising in the Muslim Ottoman province of Albania points out that, in spite of the promises and stated ambitions of the Young Turks, there was a fundamental discrepancy between those ambitions and the political and ethnic realities of the Empire. According to the report, well-informed observers did not believe that the Young Turks would succeed in ''fusing the various, differing elements of the population in the vast, loosely connected Turkish Empire into a truly Turkish nation,'' 46 a view fully shared by the contemporary Turkist ideologist Yusuf Akçura. 47 All the recent changes made by the Young Turks, which cut deeply into what the anonymous author(s) of the report describe as ''the century-old habits of a completely immature population,'' would only bring confusion and rebellion throughout the empire. 48 In 1913, after the coup by the Triumvirate, the British foreign ministry even predicted that one of the consequences would be widespread massacres of Ottoman Armenians. 49 There was a sense that the perceived problems with the non-Turkish national and religious minorities of the Ottoman Empire would eventually be ''solved'' in a violent manner. 50 The question was when and how this ''solution'' would come about.
Background and Motivation for the Genocide According to Wandel
The most well-placed Danish observer of high-level Young Turk policy, Carl Ellis Wandel, tried in September 1915 to analyze how the Young Turk ideology had evolved from seemingly democratic Ottomanism to the current mix of xenophobia and extreme nationalism, a change he believed was partly ideologically and economically driven and, partly dictated by circumstances:
The CUP took the reins of power with a motto saying ''equal rights for all Ottoman citizens.'' But to create the unity mentioned in the title of the Committee in the vast and ethnically diverse Empire, there had to be created a sense of Ottoman solidarity that included all the peoples of the Empire, while simultaneously guarantees had to be created that this new ''Ottomanism'' would also in the future be led by Young Turk members of the Committee; that is, at the same time creating equal rights for all Ottoman citizens, without regard to nationality and religion (the idealistic demands of the revolution), and making sure that this new Ottomanism would still be a purely Turkish movement. The struggle between these two demands lasted a while, until the Committee, immediately after the end of the Balkan War, resolutely discarded the first demand (equal rights for all Ottomans) and decided to pursue the road of Turkification, the road characterized by the boycott in the spring of 1914 that struck Greeks who were Ottoman subjects as well as Greek subjects, the simultaneous persecutions of Greeks in Asia Minor and Thrace, and, later that year, favoured by the World War and the subsequent annulment of the Capitulations [and] the declaration of Jihad-with German assistance-[Turkification] finally led to the xenophobic and nationalist policy, the recent consequences whereof I have several times closely examined, and which at the moment has as its main purpose the extermination of the Armenian population in the Empire. 51 In the months after the 1913 coup, the new, more radical Young Turk leadership did try to give the appearance of continuing efforts to ''Ottomanize'' and centralize the empire in a peaceful and democratic manner. But, as Wandel and other observers have noted, if this had ever in reality been CUP policy, such was no longer the case. 52 In fact, as Feroz Ahmad has put it, ''repression and violence became the order of the day.'' 53 This process of radicalization Wandel considered so vital and intriguing that he made it the theme of a number of further reports. But, though he acknowledged that the extent of the radicalization was partly caused by events outside the control of the CUP, he also emphasized that radicalization was not simply the result of various defensive ad hoc measures against, say, Western imperialism, but was in fact an integral part of an active, deliberate policy, rooted in pre-revolutionary Turkist supremacist beliefs, whose basic goal was the preservation of power.
Since it was no longer believed that this goal could be reached by a multiethnic, multireligious, Turkish-dominated union, it would be reached by somehow creating a ''Turkey for the Turks,'' economically, politically, linguistically, and ethnically, increasingly combined with the more expansionist Pan-Turkist vision of Turan, a Turkish Empire uniting ethnic Turks from all over Asia and Russia. 54 In a report from 22 September 1915, Wandel accordingly describes the nature of the CUP by describing the members of the CUP not as great idealists or founding statesmen but as organizers using every means to further their organization .. . . It is not the ideals, but the frame, that is, the power, that they have fought and are fighting for . . .. For some there is no doubt about their integrity, but it is the general understanding that [the CUP] will continue to pursue the policy it has already initiated, a policy which has led to so many conflicts.
Wandel believed, mistakenly, that this policy would eventually lead to ''national suicide.'' 55 In fact, though the costs were immense, it was an important initial step leading to the creation of the relatively homogeneous, if unstable, nation-state that is the modern Turkish Republic. 56 But, as Wandel also emphasized, even though the Young Turks generally were not ''great idealists,'' they did share some broad ideals-ideals that, if nothing else, served to legitimize their own power monopoly in particular, and the power monopoly of ethnic Turks in general, as well as serving to secure the centralization and homogenization of a disintegrating empire. 57 The nation, beginning with the areas of trade and language, was to be cleansed from what were deemed to be ''foreign elements'' in order to establish the desired national culture and economy. 58 Thus began the systematic, still ongoing process of nation building by marginalizing or destroying the non-Turkish components of, first and foremost, the age-old Anatolian multicultural make-up, a process that required both the rewriting of history and the definition of non-Turks as the ''Other.'' 59 In a lengthy report from January 1915, titled ''Political Events in Turkey in 1914,'' Wandel describes how it was only after the Young Turk dictatorship had come to power that one could see Turkish shops in Constantinople advertising that ''This Is a Muslim Business.'' 60 The fact that, according to the Danish diplomat, the Armenians and Greeks of the Ottoman Empire were at this point generally wary but loyal even toward a dictatorship made no difference. Already on 24 July 1914, Wandel had reported that ''the Christian electorate is generally opposed to the CUP's favored system of centralization and to the principle 'Turkey for the Turks,' but when it comes to improving their living conditions, they see it as necessary to work with the Committee, rather than to break with it.'' 61 This despite the fact that the Christians of the empire were subjected to what Wandel describes as a repressive and xenophobic regime that systematically discriminated against them. 62 On 6 December 1915, Wandel elaborated on how the CUP elite and Turkish intellectuals had increasingly become radical nationalists. Apart from pointing to the genocide itself, his report exemplifies this by mentioning the preceeding attempted ''cleansing'' of Greeks from Western Anatolia and of Greeks and Armenians from politics and trade; the government-controlled, xenophobic press; the nationalist schools'' and the ban on street signs and so on written in ''foreign,'' that is, non-Turkish, languages. 63 Wandel refers in this report to an article in the Turkish daily Tesfiri Efkiar from 11 November 1915, which emphasized that the Turkish language is the foundation of our national development. At the moment we are engaged in a war for our very existence, and the first result of this victorious war ought to be that it is confirmed that the Turkish language reigns supreme in Turkey. 64 Furthermore, in what Wandel dubbed the ''Germanized-chauvinistic'' Turkish press, Armenians were often described as ''greedy exploiters'' by journalists who willingly participated in the forefront of the regime's xenophobic campaign. 65 One such example was Agaoglu Ahmed Bey, the editor of the French-language Young Turk daily Hilal, which functioned mainly as a propaganda organ in the West, as well as among Westerners in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Bey, who had ''Turkified'' his name Ahmed Agaieff, thus hiding his Azeri (Tatar) background, was a Turkist ideologist who, according to Wandel, had long been known for his extreme hatred of Armenians as one of the organizers of massacres of Armenians in the Caucasus in 1905. 66 Leading Young Turks even went so far as to openly describe Armenians and other Ottoman Christians as ''tumors,'' a cancer that had to be removed so that the Turkish nation could be ''cured. '' 67 For Wandel, as well as for other observers, it was obvious that the economic and linguistic discrimination, together with other official discriminatory and repressive initiatives, created a society without room for opposition or minorities. These initiatives included the establishment of a nationwide, Turkish-nationalist, militarized ''scout movement''; the establishment of ethnic Turkish transport and trade companies; and the calling out of Turkish schoolchildren and workers to celebrate newly created national (i.e., exclusively Turkish) commemoration days and celebrations. 68 Although Wandel was rightfully doubtful whether these ''nationbuilding'' initiatives actually had any significant impact on the general population, for the Young Turks this whole process, and its acceleration during the war, was part of the Turkish people's ''wonderful awakening, which the government has long been struggling to bring about, and which had to come sooner or later, but which has now been accelerated by the war,'' as the otherwise moderate vali of Adrianople (Edirne), Hadji Adil Bey, expressed it in a speech given in his capacity as speaker at the opening of parliamentary sessions in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in November 1916. 69 The deliberate and ''rational'' nature of this Young Turk nationalist ideology was also clearly expressed by the experienced diplomat Djevad Bey, Turkish minister to Copenhagen and a diplomate de carrie`re with close connections to the Young Turk government. In an interview given to leading Danish newspaper Politiken in February 1916, he stated that
We have now introduced the Turkish language in Turkey. This is the first result of a national awakening: Turkey for the Turks . . .. When we change old signs and street names, our enemies claim that we tear down the European inscriptions out of hatred and malice. There is no truth in that. We only do what all nations have done before us. They call us chauvinists and rebels. I assure you, we only want one thing: our economical and political independence. This we all agree upon. There are no longer both old and young Turks. There are only Turks. And during the war we are all young. 70 Paradoxically, chauvinist Turks had come to believe that in order to become truly ''European''-perceived as being effective, competitive, homogenic, assertive, powerful, expansive, rich, modern, and so on-they must eliminate the perceived European elements of the Empire, that is, the Ottoman Christians, who had become an obstacle to reaching this goal. The fact that, by targeting Christians, the Young Turks also pleased the conservative, Islamist opposition was, according to Wandel, another, more opportunistic reason for this policy. 71 It is contested whether the ideology of a ''Turkey for the Turks'' can be directly related to the subsequent ''cleansing'' and massacre of Ottoman Armenians and other minorities, or whether the Armenian Genocide in particular was, rather, a ''perverse and extreme security measure based in an ethnoreligious framing,'' as Ronald Grigor Suny expresses it. 72 To me, first, these explanations are not mutually exclusive; rather, they complement each other, showing the ''twisted'' (i.e., ideological and deliberate as well as circumstantial and opportunistic) nature of the Armenian Genocide. Second, the reports Wandel sent to his superiors in Copenhagen help underline that no matter the circumstances, the extremely chauvinist ideology of the Young Turks was a main reason that, from the outbreak of World War I, the Armenians immediately and violently came to be ''ethnoreligiously framed.'' Because of the paranoid fear expressed by Talâ t that the Armenians as former allies knew, and therefore could destroy, the Young Turk organization, and the fact that many Armenians lived near the front lines in Eastern Anatolia, Armenians were perceived, both before and during the war, to be the most dangerous internal threat. 73 The war itself was most likely a crucial factor leading to the decision in favor of genocide, as it gave rise to both the opportunity of ''settling scores'' and the need for a scapegoat to divert criticism for the initial losses of the Ottoman army. The war also resulted in atrocities against Muslim civilians, as well as in scattered Ottoman Armenian nationalist activity and resistance that, through official campaigns of propaganda and misinformation, served to further legitimize, brutalize, and dehumanize. In 1915, if not before, the Turkish national identity was influenced by the loss of territory and prestige to an extent that resulted in a willingness to use exterminatory measures against those societal groups who were now thought to be threatening not only the traditional hegemony of ethnic Turks but the very survival of the Turkish nation. 74 This Young Turk ''siege mentality'' was heightened by the fact that Turks were themselves still a minority among minorities-the Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Jews, Circassians, and other groups of the Ottoman Empire.
But the cleansing from Ottoman soil of Armenians became not only a goal in itself but also an integral part of a grand project to create a Turkish nation. The regime initiated the above-mentioned simultaneous measures (''national holidays,'' etc.) aimed at imprinting a Turkish national identity upon the large majority of the Turkish population that had traditionally identified themselves mainly along (ethno-)religious lines. 75 But the removal of potential challenges to Turkish hegemony was believed to be a precondition for these ''positive'' measures to succeed, as expressed by Wandel in March 1916:
If the Young Turks have their way, the time will never come back when the Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks made up the majority in the Ottoman parliament, because they realize that such a majority sooner or later would demand that the Caliphate be replaced by a confederation, and that they would soon lose their power. The Turks have therefore chosen the only means available to them to preserve their control over Turkey-which is the complete extermination of the peoples who had the greatest possibilities to evolve after the introduction of the constitution, and with whom they have no way of competing in a peaceful struggle. 76 
The Persecution of the Ottoman Greeks in 1914: The Beginnings of Violent Turkification
Before the outright exterminatory policies of World War I were initiated, the first attempts at violently homogenizing the ethnic and religious make-up of Anatolia had already begun. In the spring and summer of 1914, when attempts at removing non-Turkish influences from the Ottoman economy had just been initiated in earnest, this policy was supplemented with the ''cleansing'' and massacre of more than 100,000 ethnic Ionian Greeks from the Aegean region. 77 This was the result of careful deliberations and preliminary research by the CUP, accompanied by a decision to hide the connection between the government and the Special Organization, the organization in charge of the operation. 78 This conclusion is confirmed by a June 1914 report to Wandel from the Danish consul in Smyrna (Izmir), Alfred van der Zee, that a large-scale, systematic, and violent banishing of what he, Van der Zee, describes as the generally very peaceful Greek population was carried out on the orders of the central government. 79 According to Van der Zee, in March 1914, the valis of Smyrna and the nearby regions had made tours of inspection to the coastal towns and villages of the vilayets, ''advising'' the local civil servants to force the Greek population out, first by economic boycotts, then, when this did not have the desired effect, by violent persecution: ''Armed 'bashibozuks' [Turkish irregular troops] attacked the Greek population, raped the Greek women, killed the children, etc. Finally, the gangs also violated non-Ottoman citizens.'' 80 These bashibozuks, alternatively called ''Turkish gangs'' in the reports, numbered 8,000 to 10,000 in the vilayet of Aidin (Smyrna) alone and were financed and run by the state. Many of these gangs consisted of members of the Special Organization and/or Muslim refugees from the Balkans or the Caucasus, the so-called muhadjirs, who, according to Wandel, carried out the persecutions, plundering and murdering ''as many of the hated Greeks as possible.'' 81 Aside from economic, ethnic, and political motives, there was a military rationale behind this policy, in the sense that the Young Turk government wanted to prevent the Greeks along the coastline from eventually becoming as a fifth column, a danger believed to be particularly imminent because Greece had come to control the nearby islands of Chios and Mytilene, which, it was claimed, could be used to launch attacks. 82 Despite attempts to keep this policy a secret, and despite attempts to deny both the existence of and the responsibility for the policy, the Young Turk government soon had to change course, facing pressure from, especially, the French government. The Young Turks were also aware that they were not ready for the war with Greece that would most likely result if the persecutions did not stop. 83 But after consultations with the Austrio-Hungarian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Count Johann Pallavicini, Wandel was convinced that a war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was bound to break out soon and that the Greek population of Anatolia would then ''be worse off than ever before.'' 84 This prediction was accurate, since, during World War I, the persecutions of the Ottoman Greeks were taken up again on a regular basis, sometimes on German initiative, and hundreds of thousands of Greeks from Anatolia and Thrace, including the Pontic Greeks from the Black Sea coast, were either killed or expelled from 1914 through 1918. In June 1917, too, Greece did join the war against the Ottoman Empire and her allies. 85 In 1914, the aim of this policy was most likely not to exterminate but, as it has been put, to ''thin out'' (and thereby significantly weaken) the Ottoman Greek population, as an extension of the policy of economic and cultural Turkification, while at the same time creating living space for the muhadjirs. 86 This policy was, as stated above, not only economically but also politically and ideologically motivated. Whatever the rationale, it was a cruel and murderous policy. As Wandel expressed it, the losses resulting from the persecutions were obviously irreparable, since ''an industrious class of people have been expelled, despite the fact that the province was already thinly populated. It can be predicted that the province will suffer from the results of this failed policy for years to come.'' 87 But the practical experiences, the impunity of the perpetrators, and the relative political ''success'' of the persecutionsthousands of Greeks fleeing in terror, leaving their homes and possessions to be taken over by Muslim refugees 88 -meant that even more radical and violent measures during World War I could be seen as not only possible but also as yet another extension of a policy of ''social engineering'' already decided upon. Besides, as Talâ t told Morgenthau during the Armenian Genocide, ''We care nothing about the commercial loss.'' 89 For the Young Turks, one of the major advantages of such a policy of homogenization was that the Western powers, particularly Britain and Russia, would be presented with a fait accompli, in that the mainly Christian groups would be gone, groups that historically had served as an excuse for these powers to interfere with what the Young Turks regarded as the internal matters of the Ottoman Empire. The persecutions of the Greek minority from 1914 onward therefore point toward an actual policy of extermination, if not in the sense that these policies were planned to be continuous parts of a ''grand scheme'' of partial and total genocides (see note 86) , then certainly in the sense that both policies were the result of xenophobic deliberations that were inherently genocidal and in the sense that the two policies were closely connected, ideologically, politically, and bureaucratically. 90 This connection is perhaps most strikingly personified by the decidedly racist founding member of the CUP, Dr. Mehmed Reşid. In 1914, as mutasarrif (governor) of the sub-province Karesi in the province of Balikesir, he was heavily involved with the persecution of the Aegean Greeks, while as vali of Diyarbekir he was responsible for the extermination of the Armenians and Assyrians in that region in 1915 and 1916. 91 With respect to the developing Young Turk policy of denial, official reactions to the 1914 persecutions also point forward toward a vital aspect of the early denial of the Armenian Genocide-the claim from Constantinople that the central government, when it came to outright killings, had no control of the regional governments or of the designated killer gangs. The interior minister, Talâ t Pasha himself, declared in June 1914 that the occurence of what he called ''regrettable incidents'' in the Smyrna region was because ''many Turkish civil servants in the provinces still believe that the orders they receive from the imperial government in Constantinople [to protect the Greek population] have been issued under pressure from the Great Powers, and therefore not issued in earnest.'' 92 Therefore, according to Talât, all responsibility for wrongdoing rested with the vali of Smyrna. The interior minister even went on what Van der Zee calls a farcical tour of the Smyrna region, traveling from city to city, making speeches promising ''complete security,'' while the local Greeks had to stay at home, day and night, to avoid being beaten up or shot. 93 There are clear indications that while the persecutions of the Ottoman Greeks was the first major step toward the ethnic, religious, and economic Turkification of the Empire, and the genocide of the Armenians the most important and radical such step, other steps were planned or desired-for instance, concerning the Ottoman Jewish minority. By December 1914, hundreds of Jews had been deported from Jaffa in Palestine to Egypt before this particular operation was stopped because of concerted protests from ambassadors Morgenthau and Wangenheim. It is believed that the Ottoman authorities generally distinguished between Jewish nationalists and the general Jewish population, perhaps as a result of such external pressure. 94 But Wandel and other observers, including some Ottoman Jews, were convinced that the process of Turkification was meant by the Young Turks to be total. For instance, on 16 95 Similarly, Wandel stated that ''the goal of the Zionist movement can . . . hardly be reconciled with the policy of the present Turkish government, which aims at removing from Turkey all foreign elements.'' 96 It was feared that the policies of extermination and/or deportation would, if unchecked, sooner or later come to include the Ottoman Jews, even though, according to Wandel, this group was generally known to be particularly ''well integrated'' into the Turkishdominated Ottoman society. 97 The massive deportations of Ottoman Kurds in 1916-1917 are yet another indication that the ideology of a ''Turkey for the Turks'' was to be realized to the fullest possible extent and that the homogenization of Anatolia was the result of a bold, criminal, highly organized, and deliberate policy. Though there are many examples showing that, during the genocide, Kurdish tribes and individuals (as well as many other Muslims) did help Armenians hide or escape from the Turkish authorities, 98 generally, Kurdish militias and villagers played a significant role as executors of the genocide. But when the vast majority of the Armenians had been cleansed from Anatolia, the Young Turks began concentrating on what they regarded as the no less troublesome Kurds.
Since it was believed that it was generally possible to assimilate Muslim minorities, 99 the Kurds were not systematically massacred but, rather, were deported to the western parts of Anatolia to be forcibly assimilated among ethnic Turks, who now began to constitute the majority in cities and regions, quite often thanks to the ''disappearance'' of the Ottoman Christians. Still, tens of thousands of Kurds were killed outright, and hundreds of thousands died of diseases and starvation 100 and they were not the only Muslim Ottoman citizens being persecuted. In 1918, George E. White, in an article titled ''Some Non-conforming Turks,'' wrote that Those rumors of impending events in Turkey, which anticipated the deportation of Armenians and similar treatment for the Greeks and other Christians of the Empire, carried the foreboding that the next step taken by the governing clique would force the Alevi Turks to abandon their Moslem nonconformity. The purpose of the ''Party of Union and Progress'' is alleged to be to create a uniform state, one in Turkish nationality, and one in Moslem orthodoxy. 101 
From Persecution to Total Genocide: The Report of 4 September 1915
Back in August 1915, as shown above, Wandel was still hoping that the CUP would not remain what he considered to be so daring and irrational as to take its chauvinist and xenophobic policy-the massacres and persecution, the forced conversions to Islam, and so on, which it pursued, as Wandel stated, under the pretext of ''military necessity'' 102 -to its final conclusion, which would be the extermination of the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire:
In my earlier reports, it has already been stated how the Young Turk government, with the aim of strengthening its position internally, lately has made xenophobia and hatred toward Christians a leading principle in its policy . . .. The aim of this policy is to force foreigners and Christians to leave the country by making their existence in Turkey intolerable, thereby at the same time satisfying the fanaticism that has become an asset for the government, but it is of course not possible to speak of the rational completion of this policy, at least not concerning the Greeks . . .. For Turkey's own sake it is probably about time that the persecutions are stopped. The fanatical Committee complains that there is no patriotism in Constantinople, which it wants to transform into a Turkish-Muslim capital, but it does not seem to realize that it makes a big mistake in driving out the foreigners and the Christians, even seen from an academic point of view, since it thereby drives out the entire intelligence of the country, the entire part of the population that is in possession of spirit, insight, and means, the businessmen, the scientists and the financiers, and that, if the principle of ''Turkey for the Turks'' is to be carried through, there will be nothing but civil servants and peasants in the country. 103 But on 4 September 1915, less than three weeks after he had expressed his almost desperate hope that the CUP would stop short of outright extermination, Wandel for the first time informed his superiors in the Danish foreign ministry that a genocide was indeed taking place:
I will briefly allow myself to give an account of the important and sad information regarding the latest developments that has been given to me by a completely trustworthy and truthful source, and which is of such a nature that it will be regretted everywhere in the Christian world. The Turks are vigorously carrying out their cruel intent, to exterminate the Armenian people. 104 This was not just a statement. Wandel backed it up by giving numerous examples of the nationwide ''evacuation'' of Armenians, a euphemistic expression that, he emphasized, meant almost certain death by organized massacres and deprivation. 105 For example, Wandel had received a letter from the Armenian Catholic bishop of Erzerum, Joseph Melchisedechian, who informed him that the parish of Khodirtchour, which consisted of twelve villages, had been completely evacuated, and that no one knew what had happened to the vanished Armenian population. 106 The Armenian Catholic bishop of Harput, Stepan Israelian, had on 23 June informed the Patriarchate that he had received orders to leave the city for Aleppo with the whole of his congregation within twenty-four hours. Later it was discovered that Israelian and approximately 1,700 other Armenians had been attacked and killed on the road between Diyarbekir and Urfa. 107 Wandel's report furthermore mentions that the archbishop of Mardin, Ignatius Maloyan, had been killed, together with approximately 700 Catholics from the congregation; that the Catholic population of Tel Armen had been wiped out completely; that the cities of Tarsus, Hedzin (Hadjin), Mersina (Mersin), and many others had been ''completely evacuated''; and that Armenian women of Angora (Ankara) had been forcibly married to Muslims, while approximately 6,000 deported men, among them seventy clergy led by Bishop Gregoire Bahaban, had been shot. 108 In that same report, Wandel states that ''even here in Constantinople Armenians are kidnapped and sent to Asia, and it is not possible to get information of their whereabouts.'' 109 He ends the report by concluding that ''the fate that has befallen the Catholic Armenians has with even greater cruelty befallen all other Armenians, as the intention of the government, as I already have had the honour to report, is to completely annihilate the Armenian people. '' 110 As for the significance to the extermination project of the question of ''Armenian loyalty''-in itself a rather meaningless phrase, since it implies some sort of general Armenian organization, mindset, and pattern of actions that did not exist-according to Wandel, it did not change significantly for the general Ottoman Armenian population after the empire entered World War I by attacking Russia and began to deport and massacre Armenians. In any case, as Wandel also pointed out, the question of ''loyalty'' had little, if anything, to do with the persecution of the Armenians, since, as his 4 September report emphasizes, the persecutions at this point took place with no regard to whether the targeted Armenians could even theoretically be construed to constitute any real threat to the Ottoman Empire. After having stated that the slaughter of the Armenians continued ''with great intensity,'' in spite of promises to the contrary that he and other diplomats had personally received from the Young Turk government, Wandel mentions that even the Armenian Catholics, who, he states, never had any political aspirations, and the Gregorian Armenians, ''who have distanced themselves from nationalist ideas to such an extent that they have given up their mother tongue and adopted the Turkish language as their own,'' were still subjected to ''the most stubborn persecution.'' 111 The Economy of Genocide: The ''Confiscations'' of Armenian Property
Another central aspect of the genocide, the ''legal'' background for the deportation of the Armenians and the confiscation of Armenian assets by the Young Turk government, was also analyzed by Wandel. On 27 May 1915, only three days after the Entente had threatened to hold Turkish civilians and military personnel responsible for ''crimes against humanity,'' the CUP rushed the passing of a law that basically gave the authorities carte blanche to deport any person they wanted. 112 The authorities, Wandel emphasized, had only to ''sense'' treason to justify the deportation of whole cities. 113 On 26 September 1915, a second ''temporary law'' was passed, without the consent of the temporarily suspended parliamentary chambers, concerning the confiscation of (Armenian) assets. It is described by Wandel as follows:
The new temporary law prescribes that the possessions of the deported Armenians are to be confiscated by the public administration. According to the law . . . it will be possible to confiscate the land belonging to all of the deported Armenians, as well as Armenian churches and schools. It is clear that the forced sale of the property, head over heels and under the current conditions, will not come close to covering the actual value of the property. The liquidation commission mentioned in the law can act completely arbitrarily. It has been given authority to annul any claims of the deported without consulting said persons, and to hand over property to other claimants without giving the deported any right or possibility to set aside such a decision. Any surplus generated by the liquidation of the possessions of the deported will, after deduction of expenses, be deposited in the ministry of finance, without any mention of when it is supposed to be paid back to the owners. Considering that the law of 27 May 1915 has laid the legal foundation for the great deportations of the Armenians and for the connected persecutions, it is easy to imagine the far-reaching consequences of an arbitrary execution of the provisions of the new law, which practically could lead to complete ruin for the Armenians of Asia Minor. 114 The Austrian military attaché to the Ottoman Empire, Joseph Pomiankowski, simply stated that the law was a farce. 115 Its aim was, in reality, to ''legalize'' and systematize the widespread profiteering from the genocide by the state, officials, the army, Muslim refugees, and local populations. In several reports Wandel mentions that the only real high-level Turkish voice of protest against the plundering and persecution of the Armenians came from Senator Ahmed Riza. 116 This is perhaps somewhat surprising, since the European-educated senator, formerly a leading Young Turk ideologue, president of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, chairman of the CUP, and still a convinced and idealistic Turkist, had earlier displayed no particular sympathy toward the Christian minorities of the empire. 117 In fact, he was early on believed to belong to the radical wing of the Young Turks, as can be discerned from the statement of a person present at a lecture given by Riza in London in 1904:
I am not sorry that the gentleman has spoken, because it shows us how impossible it is to expect any reforms in Turkey from the Young Turk party. They are only thinking of themselves. The liberties of the Christians would be just as unsafe under a Sultan with the sentiments of the gentleman [Riza] who has just sat down, as under the present Sultan. 118 But Riza definitely felt that, during the Great War, the Young Turk government went much too far in carrying out its oppressive policies against minorities such as the Armenians, a minority that, in large part, lived in provinces where Christians had never experienced justice or security, as he stated during a parliamentary debate in 1916. 119 Riza's scolding criticism of Young Turk policies could even be seen as a logical, if unusually principled, extension of his democratic beliefs, as well as of his earlier, equally scolding criticism of Western imperialism and racism. 120 He also tried constantly to convince his colleagues in the Ottoman senate that the laws ''legalizing'' these Young Turk policies were unconstitutional and unjust. 121 Although Ahmed Riza's protests were obviously in vain, and although he was frequently harrassed in Parliament by his colleagues, he did not give up on a subject that was, to him, a matter of conscience and principle.
As late as November 1917, Riza and the three other members of his small Young Turk parliamentary faction (Orkhan Bey, Mahmoud Pasha, and Damad Ferid Pasha) insisted on debating in the Ottoman parliament the unlawful confiscation of what were euphemistically called ''abandoned properties'' and the connected persecutions of Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs. This was highly unusual during the reign of the Young Turk dictatorship, since no real debate was allowed either in the governmentcontrolled press or in Parliament; when a case was brought before the parliament, it had already been decided upon by the CUP. But Riza was occasionally allowed to speak out without being disciplined or punished, and he even made sure that the criticism he raised in the Senate was, to some extent, printed in the official parliamentary record. That record was not accessible to the public, but at least some of the legations managed to get hold of it. 122 The reasons that Riza was allowed to speak out were that he, a man of integrity and some influence as one of the founders of the CUP, was still highly esteemed among parts of the general population and the elite, and also that, because he lacked a proper power base, he was regarded as relatively harmless, or even useful, by the Young Turks, as they could point to his presence in the Senate to claim that, since there was an opposition, the empire was ruled in a truly parliamentary fashion. 123 During the Senate meeting of 29 November 1917, the government proposed a law that would grant an official commission two million piastres to administer ''the preservation of the abandoned properties.'' This seemingly innocent proposition would, if passed, be a de facto legalization of the Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation of 1915, which allowed the government to ''confiscate''-that is, stealArmenian cash and property and to resell the property for profit. In the preceding two years the government had not dared to introduce that law to the parliamentary chambers, and the introduction of the appropriation law was thus an obvious attempt to obtain an indirect parliamentary blessing for an unconstitutional law. Orkhan Bey started the debate by saying exactly this: that, as the provisional or temporary law regarding the ''abandoned properties' ' had not yet been introduced to and approved by the Senate, granting the requested two million piastres would give the appearance that the Senate was approving a law it had not been given the opportunity to properly debate and approve. The Senate president, without directly commenting on Orkhan Bey's assertions, assured him that this would not be the case.
Then Riza spoke, echoing his protests in Parliament against the ''temporary law'' two years earlier, in the fall of 1915. 124 Among other things, he pointed to the fact that the very term ''abandoned properties'' was ridiculous:
We take responsibility by accepting an expression. In my opinion the expression ''abandoned properties'' means property that has been abandoned, left behind. But no one has left behind their property of their own free will. We must find an appropriate expression and say straight out, ''Law for the Preservation of Possessions of Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, who out of Political Necessity have been Removed from their Homes.'' The expression ''abandoned properties'' is not accurate, and the Senate should not accept such an inaccurate expression. In reality the population has been violently driven from their homes and been abducted by force, and their property has been left behind. This line of action is also unconstitutional, because the constitution protects the inviolability of property. I will go further and say that if the rights of property do not exist in a country . . ., no government exists either . . .. The government does claim that it has had the right to such action. Since I have yet to examine the matter in its entirety, I cannot for the moment give a definite statement thereof. The government publishes brochures with its viewpoints. Let us assume that every word in these brochures is absolutely true. Some Armenians and Greeks may very well, as the government says, have been traitors. Those you find among the Turks and the Kurds, as well as among the Armenians. But the law establishes punishment for the traitors, the criminals. You execute them, shoot them; but you never deport their families or rob their fortune. This is an outright reign of terror. 125 The Senate president was of the opinion that all of this could be discussed only when the law in question, the September 1915 law, was introduced to the Senate. But, as Riza stated once again, that law had not been introduced, and there was no sign that this would actually happen. The Senate president also remarked that the Senate had earlier approved the expression ''abandoned properties,'' and he thought it strange not to accept it this year. Riza answered that he himself had not accepted it, nor would he. He once again demanded the introduction of the confiscation law, not the ''auxiliary'' appropriation law: ''We have to know that the properties are not lost, that they remain to be given back to their rightful owners, and that these are not all dead.'' The president said that the confiscation law had been introduced to the Chamber of Deputies, but that it had not been read because of that chamber's workload, and that the Senate therefore could not blame the government. After further protests from Riza's group, who knew this to be a phony explanation, the law was passed. Thus, the Senate ended up indirectly sanctioning the bill that Riza and his small group had fought so vigorously against, the bill that indirectly ''legalized'' what was, according to Jesse B. Jackson, American consul to Aleppo, ''a gigantic plundering scheme as well as a final blow to extinguish the [Armenian] race.'' 126 
Conclusion
Space permits only an introduction to some of the most important subjects covered by Carl Ellis Wandel in relation to the Armenian Genocide. For instance, his often long and analytical reports also deals extensively with subjects such as the question of ''German complicity,'' the dynamics and relationships within the Young Turk leadership, and the official Young Turk campaign of denial and falsification of their crimes. But the sample of documents analyzed and contextualized above should leave the impression that even an unknown diplomat from a small country has something to offer when it comes to explaining important aspects of one of the largest exterminatory projects of the twentieth century. For, as Wandel convincingly argued, this was the nature of the Armenian Genocide: it was an extremely cruel, pragmatic, and opportunistic political and economical project, fueled by a highly xenophobic, nationalist (proto-)ideology, all in the context of war and of a ''grand scheme'' of radical modernization by Turkification. Contemporary official justifications of the persecutions-''military necessity,'' Armenian ''disloyalty'' or ''provocation''-were dismissed as exaggerated, fabricated, or simply irrelevant. Wandel concurred with most other contemporary and later observers that the Ottoman Armenians did not bring their fate upon themselves.
In other words, pragmatic considerations, combined with a downward spiral of more and more radicalized rhetoric and actions, as well as the opportunity created by a world war, were, for Wandel, essential in understanding why the anti-Armenian policies were intended and carried out as complete destruction and not, say, ethnic cleansing or continued oppression. To him, it was what we today would call a twisted road to the Armenian Genocide, which is probably why he did not attempt to estimate the exact time of the conception of a Young Turk plan of actual genocide. This does not mean that Wandel was taking sides, in 1915 and 1916, in a debate of ''intentionalists'' versus ''functionalists,'' as such a debate obviously did not exist at the time. If it had, it would most likely not have seemed to be of even academic interest to an eyewitness, in the face of the ongoing slaughter. Wandel simply reported on what he saw, heard, and read, as the often seemingly chaotic events progressed, and he came to conclusions about important aspects of the nature of the Armenian Genocide that are quite similar to conclusions many (but not all) contemporary observers, as well as many present-day scholars (myself included), have come to on the basis of available evidence.
Notes echoes what Arpee calls ''the Turkish need to defame the victims of his own barbarity'':
''Sometimes it has a commercialistic origin, as when some foreign business adventurer goes East in the hope of making big money, runs up against Armenian competition, and vents his disappointed ire blackening the character of a whole people. Some Armenophobia, too, has had railroad, mining, oil or other Turkish concession in view, or perhaps another Turkish loan on terms advantageous to the lenders, or the readjustment of policies of state in certain European cabinets, or the protection of vested interests as in the case of certain American educators. It may sometimes even have a semi-religious motive behind it, as when a missionary lets his zeal get the better of him in painting the darker side of the picture with the purpose of impressing the home constituency with the undeniable moral and spiritual need.'' It must be noted that many contemporary Western observers expressed equally deep resentment of the 
